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Abstract 
We study the effect of providing relative performance feedback information on performance under 
piece-rate incentives. A natural experiment that took place in a high school offers an unusual 
opportunity to test this effect in a real-effort setting. For one year only, students received information 
that allowed them to know whether they were above (below) the class average as well as the distance 
from this average. We exploit a rich panel data set and find that the provision of this information led 
to an increase of 5% in students’ grades. Moreover, the effect was significant for the whole 
distribution. However, once the information was removed the effect disappeared. To rule out the 
concern that the effect may be driven by teachers within the school, we verify our results using 
national level exams (externally graded) for the same students, and the effect remains. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Improving students’ performance has been an important concern for academics and 
educational policy makers alike. Given the recent introduction of the OECD coordinated 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), improvements in students’ 
performance, measured by their grades, is at the heart of governmental reform.1 The education 
literature has focused on school inputs as the principle means to improve students’ 
performance, in particular, reduction in pupil/teacher ratio, improved quality of teacher 
(experience and education), and extended term length (See Krueger (1999), Card and Krueger 
(1992)). There is however, a lively debate regarding the effectiveness of school inputs, largely 
due to their associated costs (Hanushek (1996, 2003)). Moreover, the PISA reports do not 
show a strong positive relationship between the amount spent per student and the performance 
in the standardised tests in mathematics, science and reading. For example, the US ranks 
second in expenditure per pupil (91,770$) but ranked twenty-second (out of 30) in 
performance (see OECD PISA report, 2006). 
More recently, there has been interest in analyzing the relevance of performance 
evaluations and feedback information regarding these evaluations. The effect of interim 
feedback information about own performance on subsequent performance has been studied 
mostly in labour settings2. The importance of interim feedback information on students’ 
performance has been empirically studied by Bandiera et al. (2008). The authors find that 
providing university students with interim feedback information about own performance has a 
positive effect on their final performance. However, feedback information involving relative 
performance has received less attention. The provision of relative performance feedback 
information allows for social comparison (individuals can evaluate their own performance by 
comparing themselves to others, Festinger (1954)). While this has been extensively studied in 
management and psychology literature (see Festinger (1954), Locke and Latham (1990) and 
Suls and Wheeler (2000) for an overview), it has not been fully explored in economics.3  
                                                 
1 For example, Germany is considering a complete revamp of their traditional education system, Gymnasium, in 
response to PISA reports (See Economist, Oct 17th 2008); in 2008, United Kingdom extended the compulsory 
school leaving age by one year; since 2001 the United States has implemented the No Child Left Behind Act. 
2 Many papers analyze the optimal provision of interim feedback information on own performance using a 
principal-agent model in a tournament setting (Aoyagi (2007) and Ederer (2008)) and under piece-rate and flat-
rate incentives (Lizzeri et al. (2002) and Ertac (2006)).     
3 The provision of relative performance feedback information has received attention mostly in the tournament 
literature. Greshkov and Perry (2007), Kräkel (2007) and Lai and Matros (2007) study the optimal provision of 
relative performance feedback information in tournaments. For empirical work see Casas-Arce and Martinez-
Jerez (2005) and Young et al. (1993). Finally, for experimental work see Muller and Schotter (2003), Hannan et 
al. (2007), Fehr and Ederer (2007) and Eriksson et al. (2008). Empirical work finds ambiguous results; while 
some authors find that the provision of relative performance feedback increases all participants’ effort, others 
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In our paper, we investigate both theoretically and empirically the role that relative 
performance feedback information plays on students’ performance. We use a natural 
experiment that took place in a high school, where for one year only, students were provided 
with relative performance feedback information in addition to the usual individual 
performance information. Typically, students received report cards containing the grades for 
each subject, where grades measured absolute performance since there was no grade curving 
(piece-rate incentives). However, during the academic year 1990-1991, students also received 
in their report card their own average (over all subjects), as well as the class average (over all 
subjects and students), such that they could observe whether they were above or below the 
class average, as well as the distance from this average. The relative performance information 
based on the class average allowed for social comparison, since students could observe 
whether they were performing better or worse than their classmates. This information 
treatment was removed after one academic year. The question we address is whether this 
additional information had any effect on students’ real effort and, therefore, on their 
performance.     
To our knowledge this is the first paper that addresses the effect of relative performance 
feedback information on performance under piece-rate incentives, in a real effort and natural 
setting.4 There are, however, two experimental papers that pose a similar question. Hannan et 
al. (2007) use an experiment (with no real effort) to compare the impact of providing relative 
performance feedback information to subjects under both, the tournament and piece-rate 
incentives. They find that for the subjects participating under piece-rate incentives, 
information regarding their position relative to the average, increases efforts for all subjects. 
Eriksson et al. (2008) on the other hand, use a two-person experiment (with real effort) to test 
the effect of providing the information about the other person’s performance under both the 
tournament and piece-rate incentives. Under piece-rate incentives, they find no significant 
effect when the information is provided. However, they do find that the subject who is 
lagging behind makes significantly more mistakes. Our paper contributes to this line of 
research by proposing alternative theories for why the relative performance feedback would 
make a difference to real effort, and by providing empirical evidence from a natural 
experiment. 
                                                                                                                                                        
find that once the relative performance feedback is provided, the leading participants slack off and participants 
who are lagging behind give up.  
4 Falk and Ichino (2006) and Mas and Moretti (2009) look at the effect of social comparison (peer effects) on 
real effort under flat-rate incentives. They find evidence for the existence of peer effects.  
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The natural experiment that took place in a high school offers a unique opportunity to 
study the importance of relative performance information under piece-rate incentives. There 
are many important features that should be highlighted. First, the experiment takes place in a 
natural setting and allows us to measure real effort through their grades. Second, the provision 
of the additional information took place for exogenous reasons in the academic year 1990-
1991. In particular, the adoption of a new application to produce report cards offered the 
possibility of including the extra information and the administrative staff (not the teachers) 
decided to use it. It was untargeted, that is, it was not introduced as a response to any 
initiative to affect performance. Third, there is no systematic difference between the year 
1990-1991 and any other year in terms of class-sizes, number of teachers, subjects taught 
and/or the evaluation system. Fourth, we have panel data on 1,313 students (3,414 grades) 
registered at the high school between the years 1986 and 1994. Typically students would 
complete four years in high school before going to University. Since we can follow the same 
students over time we are able to control for individual fixed effects. Finally, the additional 
information was removed from the report cards after one year, allowing us to exploit the 
variation in students’ performance before, during and after the treatment.   
We consider two alternative explanations for why students would react to the relative 
performance information and the empirical analysis allows us to test the relevance of each 
explanation.  
On the one hand, students might react to the additional information because individuals 
have inherently competitive preferences.5 When information that allows for social comparison 
is provided, people get utility (disutility) from being ahead (behind) of others. There are two 
important features to note. First, there is no explicit reward (penalty) derived from being 
above (below) the class average. Unlike in a tournament, students are not explicitly rewarded 
according to their relative performance but according to absolute performance (piece-rate 
incentives)6. Second, the relative performance information is private information such that it 
is different from status-seeking preferences. We will refer to this theory as the preferences-
based or competitiveness theory. We show that based on this explanation, when the relative 
                                                 
5 There is extensive work on preferences that include social comparison, such as negative interdependent 
preferences (Kandel and Lazear’s (1992), Charness and Rabin (1999), Ok and Kockesen (2000)), and 
preferences over relative income (Duesenberry (1949), Easterlin (1974), Layard (1980), Frank (1984, 1985), 
Clark and Oswald (1996), Hopkins and Kornienko (2004), Dubey and Geanakoplos (2004, 2005),  Moldovanu et 
al. (2005)). Note that competitive preferences are different from preferences that show inequity aversion (Fehr 
and Schmitd (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)). This is explained in Section 3.  
6 There is an extensive literature on tournaments and contests as optimal contracts (See Prendergast for a literary 
review).  
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performance information is provided, all students would choose higher effort, and therefore 
higher performance would be observed.  
On the other hand, students might react to the additional information because individuals 
have an imperfect knowledge of their own ability, such that the additional information is 
informative of one’s own ability. Moreover, if performance is a function of both ability and 
effort, where ability and effort are complements in performance, then the self-perceived 
ability will affect the optimal choice of effort. Relative performance feedback affects the self-
perceived ability and, therefore, the choice of effort. We will refer to this theory as the self-
perception theory. We show that based on this explanation, top (bottom) performing students 
would choose higher (lower) effort, because this information encourages high ability 
(discourages low ability) students.  
We find that the feedback information on relative performance had a strong positive 
effect on students’ performance. Overall, we find a 5% increase in their grades. This is 
comparable, if not better than the effects found by the literature on improving school inputs. 
For example, Krueger (1999) uses an experimental study (the Tennessee Student/Teacher 
Achievement Ratio (STAR)), where students were randomly assigned to small or regular size 
classes, to show that reducing class size from 22 to 15 leads to internal rate of return of 6%. 
More importantly, contrary to improving school inputs, providing feedback information on 
relative performance involves no additional cost. Moreover, this positive effect is significant 
throughout the grade distribution, where the strongest effects are found at the tails of the 
distribution. This supports the competitive preferences rather than the self-perception 
hypothesis, since we do not observe top performing students reacting differently from bottom 
performing students. It has also important policy implications, as it implies that the students at 
the top as well as bottom of the distribution react positively. In addition, we find that when 
the relative performance feedback information is removed, the effect disappears, such that 
there is no lasting effect of the treatment.   
A more detailed analysis shows that there are heterogeneous effects from the provision of 
relative performance feedback information. First, the effect is significant only for students in 
the first and fourth years of high school. It is reasonable to assume that in the first year of high 
school the relative performance feedback information provides new information and that 
students might be more reactive to it than in the subsequent years. As for the fourth year 
effect, given that the grades during this year are especially important in determining the final 
university entry grade, one may believe that any additional information regarding grades will 
provoke a reaction. Second, the positive effect is strongest in science subjects such as 
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Mathematics, as well as in language subjects. This has important policy implications since 
there has been a special interest in improving grades in more technical subjects such as Math. 
Third, we also find that, although girls overall obtain better grades than boys there is no 
significant gender difference in the reaction to the information that allows for social 
comparison7.  
One may question whether the positive effect is driven by students, parents or teachers. 
While it is almost impossible to disentangle whether the effect is coming from students or 
their parents, we are able to rule out the possibility that teachers are artificially driving the 
effect. We use an external source of variation coming from national level exams, Selectividad, 
(similar to the Scholastic Aptitude Tests (SAT) used in the United States), completed at the 
end of the fourth year of high school. Selectividad differs from SAT in that it tests the 
knowledge on the topics covered during the last year of high school, such that effort and 
performance in this year should be highly correlated with the performance on the Selectividad 
test. The similarity is that both exams are written and graded by external bodies, such that the 
teachers in the school have no way to affect these grades. We replicate the analysis using the 
grades from the national level exams and find the same positive and strong effect.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the natural experiment in detail. 
Section 3 derives theoretical predictions for why and how we would expect students to react 
to the additional information. Section 4 describes the data and presents the main descriptive 
statistics. Section 5 presents the results from the empirical analysis. As well as identifying and 
quantifying the treatment effect, we thoroughly investigate the impact of the information 
treatment. Finally, we conclude in Section 6. The web appendix provides further details8. 
 
2.  Description of Natural Experiment 
The natural experiment took place in a high school located in the province of Gipuzkoa in 
the north of Spain (the Basque Country) during the academic year 1990-1991. The high 
school was a private, but subsidized, school where education was provided in Basque, while 
Spanish and English (or French) were taught as language subjects. The alternative to this 
private Basque school was the public school where three different language options were 
offered: an education in Basque (with Spanish as a language subject), an education in Spanish 
(with Basque as a language subject) and a mixed education in Basque and Spanish (where 
                                                 
7 This finding is consistent with the Niederle and Yestrumskas (2008) finding that women and men do not differ 
in their preferences over receiving relative performance feedback information.  
8 The web appendix is available at http://www.econ.upf.edu/~azmat/ and http://www.econ.upf.edu/~iriberri/ . 
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some subjects are taught in Basque and others in Spanish)9. The main deciding factor to 
choose among these competing alternatives was the preference for an education in Basque.10 
Tables 1-4 in the web appendix show the comparison of the main macro variables between 
Gipuzkoa, Basque Country and Spain.  
The natural experiment occurred in the academic year 1990-1991. Typically, students 
would receive a report card at the end of each quarter (November, February, April and June). 
These report cards would provide the list of subjects taken and the grade obtained in each of 
the subjects. Grades measure absolute performance since there was no grade curving (see 
Section 4, Figure 1). In the academic year of 1990-1991, the treatment year, the computer 
application used to produce students’ report cards changed.11 This change resulted in students 
being provided with additional information that facilitated social comparison. In particular, as 
well as the list of grades obtained in each of the subjects, students were also provided with 
their own average grade across all subjects and the class average grade across all subjects. 
This allowed a direct comparison between the students’ own average grade with the average 
grade of the class. Moreover, students could observe whether they were above or below the 
class average, as well as the distance between their own average grade and the class average 
grade. Given that students received report cards four times during the academic year, they 
received this additional information four times during the treatment year. However, we only 
have one grade per subject for each academic year, which is an average over the four quarter 
grades (see Section 4 for a discussion on how this may affect the parameter estimates). 
Finally, the information treatment was removed after the academic year 1990-1991, lasting 
for only one year, and consequently the additional information was simply omitted from 
academic year 1991-1992 onwards. The removal was due primarily to parents’ and teachers’ 
complaints.12 See Figures 1, 2, and 3 in the web appendix for an example of the report cards 
before, during and after the experiment, respectively. 
There are several important features of this natural experiment that make it almost like a 
randomized field experiment. First, it was an experiment that took place in a real 
environment, where grades can be used as a measure of real effort. Second, the introduction 
of the additional information was exogenously applied, without being a meditated decision of 
                                                 
9 There was no annual fee to attend public school, while for the private Basque school the fees were subsided by 
the local government.  
10 Basque private schools, known as Ikastolas, were first founded in the 1960s. For more information about the 
history of Ikastolas, see www.ikastola.net . 
11 The adopted software was provided by COSPA. For more information see http://www.cospa-agilmic.com  
12 From private communication with school officials, we could find out that the main complaint against 
providing this additional information was that it fostered competition among students, which many parents and 
teachers considered it to be a negative thing.   
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school officials or teachers. The new computer application offered the possibility of providing 
the extra information and the administrative staff decided to incorporate it. Third, it was 
untargeted, that is, it was not introduced as a response to any initiative to affect performance. 
Finally, it took place in an arbitrary year that was not systematically different from any other 
year in our sample. In principle, no other significant differences occurred in 1990-1991 with 
regard to class-sizes, teachers, subjects/material taught and the evaluation system, as we will 
justify in Section 4 (Table 3).  
The drawback of this experiment is that there is no “control group” per se because all 
groups in year 1990-1991 were affected by the treatment. Ideally, one would like to have both 
treatment and control groups at the same year. However, the richness of our data in terms of 
number of years and individual level panel data, as well as the off-on-off nature of the 
treatment, allow us to overcome this identification problem.   
 
3. Theoretical Predictions: Why We Would Expect Students to React to Relative 
Performance Feedback information 
In this section we review two different theoretical frameworks that predict how students 
would react to the additional information. On the one hand, students may react to the 
additional information because individuals have inherently competitive preferences. When 
information that allows for social comparison is provided, people get utility (disutility) from 
being ahead (behind) of others. On the other hand, students may react to the additional 
information because individuals have an imperfect knowledge of their own ability, and the 
additional information that allows for social comparison is informative of one’s ability.  
Both competitiveness and self-perception theory consider N 2≥  students who differ in 
their ability, [ ]aaFai ,∈ , and choose effort levels, [ ]eeei ,∈  where .,...2,1 Ni =  For each 
student i, both ability and effort levels yield deterministically their performance at school, 
given by the expression ),( iii eap , which is represented by their grades. Performance is 
assumed to be increasing and strictly concave in both ability and effort. Effort is costly and 
the cost function, given by )( iec , is increasing and strictly convex in effort. Moreover, effort 
and ability are complements in performance, that is, effort is more productive for high ability 
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students as for low ability students.13 In the following sections, we will compare students’ 
optimal effort levels, when the relative performance feedback is provided (treatment) and 
when it is not (control), for the two different models.  
 
3.1 Preferences-based Theory: Competitiveness 
We will show that the competitiveness theory predicts that students will react to the 
additional information exerting more effort and therefore, we would expect a higher 
performance level during the treatment year. 
We assume that ability and effort levels are privately known to each student, such that 
students choose their optimal effort level. The utility shown below presents a specific form of 
competitive preferences.14 We assume all individuals have homogeneous preferences.15  

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),()(),( α  for .,...2,1 Ni =  (3.1) 
We distinguish between two main settings.  
On the one hand, in the absence of any information about others’ performance, social 
comparison is not possible ( 0=α ). Then, students can only choose their effort level in a 
simple decision making setting, where marginal benefits and costs of effort are compared.  
                                                 
13 The assumptions for the performance function include ,0
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specification is equivalent to having a performance function that only depends on ability and a cost function that 
depends on both ability and effort in a way that effort is at least as costly for low ability students as to high 
ability students.  
14 Many specific models that incorporate competitiveness have been proposed. The model proposed in this paper 
is close to Kandel and Lazear’s (1992) model where peer pressure enters additively into the utility function. A 
specific form of peer pressure mentioned by the authors is the difference between the average effort and one’s 
effort, which is the same as our functional form. Charness and Rabin (1999) propose a simple linear utility in 
which others’ payoffs enter negatively in one’s utility. Dubey and Geanakoplos (2004, 2005) and Moldovanu et 
al. (2005) assume individuals have knowledge of the complete ranking and they assume individuals get positive 
utility from the number of individuals below them and negative utility from the number of individuals above 
them. Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) propose a utility in which “status” or position in the ranking enters 
multiplying the absolute income.  
15 We could relax this assumption. One could assume that competitive preferences are correlated with ability, 
which would change the predictions of Result 1. In particular, we would expect the grade dispersion to increase 
because high ability will exert more effort but low ability would not. 
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On the other hand, when information on others’ performance is provided in the form of 
the average performance such that social comparison is possible ( 0>α ), the setting becomes 
strategic. Each student, on top of the simple benefit/cost analysis of effort, can directly 
compare her performance with the class average performance. In that case, the utility function 
in (3.1) is composed of two differences. The first difference captures the purely decision 
making situation mentioned above. The second difference captures a purely competitive 
game, where students get a positive utility if they perform above the average and a negative 
utility if they perform below the average. The intuition behind this second difference in the 
payoff function resides in the appreciation or depreciation of a specific performance level 
depending on whether it has outperformed or underperformed with respect to the class 
average. For example, according to the utility function in equation (3.1) a grade of 7, in a 
scale between 0 and 10, will yield higher utility if the average grade in the class was 6, than if 
the average was 8. In other words, any performance level that is above the class average gets 
inflated while any performance level that is below the class average gets deflated. Although 
the utility in (3.1) shows some resemblance with the utility presented by Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000) to represent inequity aversion preferences, there are significant 
differences.16  
We will compare the optimal level of effort, when social comparison is possible ( 0>α ) 
to when social comparison is not possible ( 0=α ), given the competitive preferences depicted 
in (3.1).  
Result 1: Given competitive preferences in (3.1), for any ability level, the optimal 
effort level when social comparison is possible ( 0>α ) is higher than the optimal effort 
level when social comparison is not possible ( 0=α ).   
The proof, shown in the Proof of Result 1 in the web appendix, is straightforward when 
comparing the first-order conditions for the two settings, when social comparison is possible 
and when it is not. The intuition is that the purely competitive game pushes the effort level up. 
If we focus only on the competitive game, such that effort is costless, students could do no 
better than to choose the highest effort level since this would reduce (increase) the negative 
(positive) difference between their performance and the class average performance for low 
(high) ability students.  
 
                                                 
16 Individuals who show inequity aversion get disutility when their outcome is different from the average 
outcome, whether their outcome is above or below the average, since they want to reduce differences and 
inequalities. However, competitive individuals get disutility only if their outcome is below the average outcome 
since when their outcome is above the average they want to increase differences and inequalities. 
 11 
3.2 Self-perception Theory: Learning about Own Ability 
We will show that the self-perception theory predicts that high ability (low ability) 
students will react to the additional information exerting more (less) effort and therefore, we 
would expect a higher (lower) performance level for high ability (low ability) students, during 
the treatment year.   
We adapt the model proposed by Ertac (2006) to the type of relative performance 
feedback information provided in the natural experiment we study17. The main feature of this 
model is the assumption that students do not perfectly observe their own ability, such that 
they use both own performance feedback information and social comparison information, 
one’s performance in comparison with others’ performance, to learn about it.  Students 
receive a noisy signal of their own ability.  
η+= ii as  .,...2,1 Ni =  (3.2) 
The shock, η, represents a common shock to performance. It can be interpreted as the 
easiness of the exam. Ability, ia , is independently distributed according to ),(
2σaN  and the 
common shock, η , is distributed according to ),0( 2ψN . In addition, ability and the common 
shock are independently distributed. Furthermore, when the social comparison information is 
revealed, students also observe the average signal. 
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 (3.3) 
Both the individually received signal as well as the average signal (when provided) will 
be informative about their own ability. Self-perceived ability in turn determines the optimal 
effort level. Both ability and effort levels yield deterministically their performance at school 
and for simplicity we will assume performance is given by iiiii eaeap =),( . 
We distinguish between two main settings.  
On the one hand, in the absence of any information about others’ performance, social 
comparison is not possible (NSC) and students can only use their private signal about own 
performance ( is ) to form the expected value of their own ability.  
[ ] [ ] )()(),( iiiiiiiiiNSCi ecesaEseceapEu −=−=   (3.4) 
                                                 
17 Ertac (2006) presents a principal-agent model and analyzes the effect of feedback information regarding own 
past performance and others’ past performance under different types of contracts. Since in the natural experiment 
we study the treatment variable is social comparison information in the form of average grade of the class, and 
the incentive structure is fixed where students’ performance is evaluated according to their grades (piece-rate), 
we focus on the effect of the class average grade on students’ effort levels.   
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On the other hand, when information on others’ performance is provided (SC), in the 
form of the average performance of the class composed by N students, s , relative performance 
information is also used to form the expected value of their own ability. We will compare the 
optimal level of effort in theses two settings. 
[ ] [ ] )(,,)(),( iiiiiiiiiSCi ecessaEsseceapEu −=−=  (3.5) 
Result 2: If *ssi > then ),()(
** ssese i
SC
i
NSC < and if *ssi <  then ),()(
** ssese i
SC
i
NSC > , 
where a
N
N
ass +
+
+
−=
22
22 )(
)(*
ψσ
ψσ
. Students whose signal is above (below) *s  should put 
in more (less) effort, when social comparison information is provided. 
  The proof, shown in Proof of Result 2 in the web appendix, is straightforward when 
comparing the first-order conditions for the two settings, with and without social comparison 
shown in equations (3.4) and (3.5). The comparison reduces to the difference 
between [ ]ii saE and [ ]ssaE ii , . Notice that when the average signal is equal to the 
unconditional expected ability, as = , then the ss =* , so that every student whose signal is 
above (below) the average signal should put in higher (lower) effort level when the social 
comparison information is provided. However, when as ≠ , then the average signal is 
informative about the easiness or difficulty of the exam, which determines the threshold 
signal, *s , to be higher (lower) than the average signal when as > and as < respectively. 
 
3.3. Testable Hypothesis 
We now summarize the main hypothesis regarding the predicted sign of the effect that the 
relative performance feedback information can have on performance, based on the alternative 
theoretical models depicted in the previous section. 
Null Hypothesis: No effect on grades. 
The null hypothesis is that we should find no effect for the additional information 
provided during the treatment year. There are two main explanations for why this might be 
the null hypothesis. Firstly, based on the preferences-based explanation, this would suggest 
that either the students’ utility is unaffected by social comparison (no competitive 
preferences), or that the students already possess the relative performance information that 
allows for social comparison, such that, the fact that it is explicitly provided adds no extra 
information. Second, based on the self-perception explanation, this would suggest either that 
students do not have an imperfect notion of their ability or that again this relative performance 
information is known without the explicit provision of it.  
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Alternative Hypothesis: 
(1) Positive effect on grades for all students.  
(2) Positive effect on grades for high ability students and negative effect on grades for 
low ability students. 
We consider two alternative hypotheses. On one hand, based on the preferences-based 
explanation and assuming that the additional information that allows for social comparison is 
really new to the students, then we would expect all students’ grades to be higher during the 
treatment year with respect to the other years. Also, we should observe no differences in the 
dispersion among the grade distribution. On the other hand, based on the self-perception 
explanation we would expect students’ grades to be higher (lower) for those high ability (low 
ability) students because students who find out they are above (below) certain threshold 
should be encouraged (discouraged). This implies that the dispersion among the grade 
distribution should increase. Notice that for being able to discriminate among the two 
hypotheses, it is necessary to look at the effect of the information treatment throughout the 
distribution of students’ grades (see Sections 5.3), as well as to look at the effect of the 
treatment on the dispersion among students’ grades (see Section 5.5).  
4. Data Description and Descriptive Statistics 
In this section we begin by describing the data from the natural experiment. We have data 
on students’ grades for all subjects between the years 1986-1987 and 1994-1995 (3,414 
grades). Grades range between 1.5 and 9.5, see Table 5 in the web appendix for a full list of 
the possible grades and their numerical conversion. Although students received their report 
card four times in an academic year, we can only observe their yearly grades by subjects, 
which are an average over the four quarters. This has two implications. First, since students 
receive this information for the first time when they receive their grades in the first quarter, 
they can only react to the additional information from the second quarter onwards. In turn, 
this implies that any effect that we observe on the average grade over all four quarters will be 
weaker than the “true” effect. Second, we are unable to observe whether the effect is equally 
intense in the second, third and fourth quarters or the effect is strongest in the second quarter 
and then vanishes. Hannan et al. (2007) provide laboratory experimental subjects with relative 
performance information three times as in our natural experiment, and they observe the effect 
does not vanish over time.    
Students stay in high school for four years, starting at the age of fourteen and finishing at 
the age of seventeen. We will refer to each of the four high school years as Levels 1 to 4, 
while years will refer to academic years between 1986 and 1994. We are able to identify each 
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student and follow them through each level of school. Overall, we have an unbalanced panel 
of 1,313 students. In Table 1, we show the number of students by each of the years and levels. 
Year 1990 is the treatment year and there are six full cohorts of students. We can see that 
within each cohort, there is attrition from one level to the next, and this is more pronounced 
from Level 3 to Level 4. Sometimes the number of students increases from one year to the 
next, either because new students enter the school or because there are students who repeat 
the year. Finally, from year 1990 onwards we observe that the number of entering students 
falls. This is partly due to the end of the baby boom cohort and also because a nearby middle 
school extended its studies to high school level. We have the grades data on the students who 
chose to stay in their nearby school but exclude these students from our analysis, as they did 
not receive the additional information. We do, however, check that there was no selection or 
reduced class size effects coming from this change.18  
In Level 1, students are randomly divided into three (or four) groups. In Levels 1 and 2, 
students have a specified set of compulsory subjects that they must undertake. However, in 
Level 3, students have to choose between Arts or Science specializations, which they usually 
follow through in Level 4. In Table 2, we list the subjects and their mean grades and standard 
deviations by level. We can see that the average grades in Mathematics, Physics and 
Technical Drawing are generally lower while in subjects such as Religion, Music and 
Physical Education are typically higher. 
Grades are not curved and therefore, they measure absolute performance. Figure 1 
provides evidence that grades are not curved. We show the grade distribution for two subjects 
(Basque and Math) that are compulsory in all four levels. Each vertical bar represents the 
distribution of grades in a particular group and academic year, and the shaded regions show 
the proportion of students that obtain each grade (1.5, 4, 5.5, 6.5, 7 and 9.5). In line with 
grades not being curved, the distribution of grades varies widely across group-years. We have 
repeated this analysis for other subjects and we get quantitatively similar results.  
At the end of Level 4 students also take a standardized final exam called Selectividad 
(similar to the Scholastic Aptitude Tests (SAT) used in the United States) before they can 
access University. For the students in our sample, we have data on their Selectividad grades. 
The final grade, that will determine entry into University, is composed of 50% of the 
Selectividad grade and 50% of the average grade of Levels 1 to 4. However, the Selectividad 
                                                 
18 By repeating our analysis with these students included, our results remain unchanged. Moreover, class sizes do 
not change, instead of four classes in Level 1 there are now three classes but this is the number of class in 
subsequent years and in many other levels over time. 
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exams are based on material covered only in Level 4, which gives Level 4 a much higher 
weight on determining the University entry grade. 
In Table 3, we list the main descriptive statistics for all years combined and separately for 
the treatment year in 1990. From the table we can see that there were no significant 
differences between the treatment and the other years regarding class sizes, the number of 
teachers, students’ gender composition and the proportion of repeaters. The only remarkable 
difference, shown later in the results, is the drop in attrition from Level 1 to 2 and Level 3 to 
4. Overall, class sizes are on average around 30 students; the number of teachers per year is 
between 12 and 15; the frequency of girls is slightly higher than 50 percent; and the Science 
track is more frequently chosen than the Arts track.  
 
5. Econometric Analysis 
This section identifies and quantifies the effect the relative performance information 
feedback had on students’ performance. We split the analysis into several parts. First, we 
analyze whether the treatment had any effect on students’ performance. Second, we proceed 
to quantify this effect and check for its robustness. From these results, we are able to reject 
the null hypothesis of there being no effect. Third, we look deeper into the impact of the 
treatment, regarding the type of students affected, the specific subjects and the different high 
school levels. We then move from the mean analysis to the analysis of the effect of the 
feedback information on the dispersion among students’ grades. The analysis in Sections 5.3 
and 5.5 especially focus on discriminating among the two proposed theoretical explanations. 
We conclude the section with some robustness checks.  
 
5.1. Identifying the Effect: Kernel Distribution 
Figure 2 shows the kernel distribution of grades for all students before (1986-1989), 
during (1990) and after (1991-1994) the additional information treatment. We observe that the 
grade distribution is to the right of the grade distributions observed before and after the 
treatment. This shows that the additional information had an effect and that this effect was 
positive, resulting in higher grades during the treatment year. Moreover, we see that the 
treatment affects all parts of the distribution and in particular the tails of the distribution. Once 
the treatment is removed, we observe that the distribution of grades moves back in the 
direction of the distribution before the treatment was introduced. However, this post treatment 
distribution does not completely return to the pre treatment distribution. This may be due to 
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either lasting effects of the treatment after it is removed, or due to grade inflation over time19. 
We disentangle the two effects in the following analysis. 
Figure 3, shows the kernel distribution of the grades for all students before (1986-1989), 
during (1990) and after (1991-1994) the additional information treatment, separated by Level. 
From the figures, it is clear that the strongest positive effects appear in Levels 1 and 4. We see 
that both the tails and the mean shift to the right during the treatment year. With regard to 
Levels 2 and 3, the differences appear to be more spurious20.   
The rest of our analysis will quantify these results and test their robustness.   
 
5.2. Quantifying the Effect: Estimation 
In this section we proceed to quantify the effect of the additional information that allowed 
for social comparison. We start with a simple estimation of this treatment effect on the 
average grade (across all subjects) at the individual student level.21 We compare various 
estimators. Then, we check for the robustness of this effect using controls and placebo 
treatments.   
We begin with a simple estimation to quantify the effect of the additional information, 
which allowed for social comparison, on the average grade (across all subjects) of student i in 
year t, itGrade . We pool all years between 1986 and 1994, identifying separately the treatment 
year 1990. We also include a linear trend to capture the grade inflation over the years.  
itit YearTrendGrade εβββ +++= 1990210  (5.1) 
In Table 4 columns 1 to 3 we show the results from this estimation using three different 
estimators: ordinary least squares (OLS), random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE), 
respectively. According to the three estimators the additional information that allowed for 
social comparison clearly had a positive and highly significant effect on students’ average 
grades. Overall, the marginal effect is between 0.275 and 0.296, which at the average grade 
corresponds to approximately 4.5% increase in performance. This is a remarkable effect with 
significant policy implications. Our results are comparable to other factors that have an 
impact on increasing performance in schooling, such as reduced class sizes, or increased 
                                                 
19 Since we are following students throughout their high school years, those students who received treatment in 
Levels 1, 2 or 3, remained in the school in their following year. Having had the information about their position 
in the class might also affect their performance in subsequent years (despite the information being removed). We 
refer to this effect as being the lasting effect studied in Section 5.4.   
20 Note that in Level 1 there is no lasting effect from previous years but in Levels 2, 3 and 4 any difference that 
we observe in the post-treatment years might be due to the lasting effect.  
21 The information was given at class level. However, since students are randomly assigned into classes in Level 
1, there should be no difference across classes in the average grade. We check for this and find no difference. 
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school expenditure (see Krueger (1999)). However, many papers have found small or no 
effect of expenditure on students’ performance (Hanushek (1996)). It is important to note that 
while these other measures have shown to be quite costly, providing information involves 
almost no cost.  
We extend our analysis to include additional control variables, X, where X includes 
gender, level of study (Level 1-4) and whether the students are repeating the level.  
ititit XYearTrendGrade εδβββ ++++= '1990210  (5.2) 
From column 4 to 6 in Table 4 we can see that the effect of the treatment year remains 
positive and significant, although the coefficient falls very slightly for each of the three 
estimators. With respect to the control variables, the results go in the expected direction. 
Female students outperform male students significantly. Students repeating a level do 
significantly worse compared to others when all students are pooled together (in the OLS 
specification) but once unobserved ability differences (i.e., individual fixed effects) are taken 
into account, they improve on their own previous performance. Regarding different levels, the 
students in their final levels, Level 3 and Level 4, do on average worse than in the first two 
levels. We can see that the students peak in their second year, Level 2, and do the worst in 
their final year, Level 4. This is plausible since the final years are more demanding than the 
first years but at the same time, the first year involves adjustment to the new environment (the 
transition from middle to high school. 
Using only the OLS, one could argue that the observed effects are a result of the students 
in year 1990 being intrinsically different from other years. For example, if there was a 
complete replacement of students with higher ability students in the treatment year, we would 
expect to observe exactly the same effect. Since we have individual level data over each of the 
high school years (panel data at student level), we are able to rule out this possibility using the 
panel data estimations and by using a dynamic OLS specification (see columns 7 and 8). The 
inclusion of students’ past grades enables us to control for students’ unobserved 
characteristics such as ability. We can only do this for Levels 2 to Level 4. As we would 
expect, previous grades are usually highly correlated with current grade. If there was 
something special about the 1990 students it should be captured by the coefficient on previous 
grades, making the Year 1990 variable insignificant. However, we see that this is not the case 
because by using RE, FE and the dynamic OLS specification, the treatment years’ effect 
remains positive and significant. 
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Our preferred estimator is the RE, since we do not lose variables that are fixed over time 
(as we do with FE) nor do we lose information by lagging grades (as we do with the dynamic 
OLS).22 In the tables that follow we will use RE whenever we use the panel element and OLS 
when using repeated cross sectional data. 
In Table 5 we provide some robustness checks. In columns 3 and 4 we cluster the average 
grades at the group and year level, with and without controls. Although the standard errors 
increase slightly there is no change in the significance of any of the variables. In addition, to 
rule out the concern that the results are being driven by significant changes in the pool of 
teachers during the treatment year, in columns 5 and 6 we repeat the analysis controlling for 
the teacher fixed effects. We observe that, although the coefficient on the treatment variable 
decreases slightly, it remains positive and significant (at the 1% level). Given the robustness 
of the treatment effect, we will focus on equation (5.1) in the rest of this section. 
In order to check whether the positive and significant effect that we have found is 
particular to the treatment year, we estimate equation (5.1) for the other years in our data. We 
perform this placebo treatment in two ways. First, we use only the years prior to 1990. Since 
there are potential lasting effects of the treatment in the subsequent years, we avoid this by 
only including the prior years to the treatment. Second, we use only Level 1 students’ data for 
all years (except 1990), since there is obviously no concern for there being any lasting effect 
of the treatment for these students.  
Figure 4 shows the placebo treatments for the years prior to 1990. Here, we can see that 
for all years the treatment is insignificant at both the 1% and 5% level. Moreover, there is a 
clear spike in year 1990, with no increasing pattern in the average grades over the years. To 
ensure that this effect is neither a new state nor the beginning of a new increasing pattern, we 
want to be able to check the post treatment years. The only way we can cleanly do this, is by 
using data for Level 1 students only. This is shown in Figure 5. We can see here that the spike 
remains in the treatment year and that all other years are insignificant with the exception of 
1994. In 1994, we see a large drop in the average grade which we cannot fully explain. This 
may be due to a smaller sample size that we have for Level 1 in 1994 or some other change in 
the school that we are unaware of. To ensure this is not affecting our main result, we 
replicated all of our analysis (equations (5.1) and (5.2)) by removing 1994. By doing so our 
main results hold and the coefficients are unchanged.  
                                                 
22 A Hausman test based on a contrast between the FE and RE estimators gives a chi-squared statistic of 2.5. 
This is not significant at the 5% level and so we do not reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between the 
individual effects and explanatory variables.  
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5.3. Quantifying the effect: Who, What, Where 
In this section we look more closely at the impact of the treatment effect across levels, 
students’ gender and ability, and subjects. Here we find evidence in support of the 
competitive preferences hypothesis rather than the self-perception theory. 
Since one might expect important differences across levels in reacting to such a policy, 
we begin by disaggregating the effect of additional information on average performance 
across Levels 1 to 4. In Table 6 we estimate equations (5.1) and (5.2) from the previous 
section by level. What is striking from this table is that while the effect is insignificant for 
Levels 2 and 3, there is a strong and positive effect for the first and final levels, Levels 1 and 
4. Moreover, the coefficients on both Levels 1 and 4 are twice as large as the quantified effect 
at the aggregated level (shown in column 1). These estimates imply that the additional 
information led to an increase of 8% and 9% in the grades of students in Level 1 and Level 4, 
respectively. A plausible explanation for such a difference across levels may be related to how 
much prior knowledge students have about their position within the class. One might expect 
that the first year students have very little information about the ability of their classmates and 
therefore, whether they are above or below the average. Students in the other levels, on the 
other hand, might have a clearer picture of their position within the class. This is in line with 
the ability perception theory. Although we do not find that the relative performance 
information discourages students in the left tail of the distribution, we do find that the effect is 
more significant in Level 1, when the relative performance information is definitely new 
information. However, this does not explain the strong and positive effect in Level 4. One 
explanation for such an effect might be due to the importance grades attain in this final year. 
The grades in Level 4 strongly determine the entry grade for university, making them very 
prominent during this year. Students might therefore put a greater emphasis on social 
comparison during this crucial year.    
Next, we look into the students’ individual characteristics; in particular, there may be 
differential treatment effects by gender and ability, respectively. One may also believe that 
girls react differently to this additional information. We estimate the following equation to 
test for such differences. 
itit YearGirlGirlYearTrendGrade εβββββ +++++= 1990*1990 43210  (5.3) 
In Table 7 we can see that, although girls do better than boys throughout high school, 
there does not appear to be any gender differences in reaction to the additional information. 
This is consistent with Niederle and Yestrumskas (2008).   
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Also, to understand the complementarities between the treatment and student ability, we 
look at whether high ability students are more/less affected by the treatment than low ability 
students. This is especially important as it allows us to discriminate between the two proposed 
theoretical frameworks, the competitiveness and the self-perception models. We do this in 
three ways. 
Firstly, to understand which part of the grade distribution was most affected by the 
treatment, we estimate quantile regression using equation (5.1). In Figure 6, we plot the 
coefficients of the treatment year for each quantile. Although the coefficients are significant 
for most parts of the distributions, in line with what we observed in our kernel distributions, 
we can see that the students at the tails of the distributions are affected the most. This is a very 
interesting result, since it rejects the hypothesis that students at the lower end of the 
distributions might be discouraged by social comparison of this kind.    
Second, using cross-sectional data, it is very difficult to disentangle ability from the 
treatment effect in a given year. The inclusion of students’ past grades enables us to control 
for students’ unobserved characteristics such as ability. Using the panel element of the data, 
we can control for students’ ability by the previous year’s grades. We define the dummy 
variable 1−itAbove  for those students whose grades are above the average of their level in the 
previous year. We interpret this as being high ability students.  
itititit AboveYearAboveTrendGrade εβββββ +++++= −− 1431210 901990  (5.4) 
In Table 8 we can see that the year 1990 did not affect differently those students who are 
high or low ability. This is in line with what we observed in the quantile regression. This has a 
desirable policy implication. One important concern (criticism of this policy) may be that the 
information that facilitates social comparison might discourage those students who are below 
the average. The results in Table 8 clearly suggest that this is not the case, since there is no 
differential effect. Although we see a strong positive relationship between current and past 
grades, the treatment did not affect differently those who are above and below the average. 
Moreover, we see that the treatment year effect remains positive and significant with the 
inclusion of these additional variables. 
Finally, we complement the analysis above with a more refined students’ grade 
distribution. We define four grade groups: students whose average grades are between (a) 8 
and 10, (b) 7 and 7.9, (c) 5 and 6.9 and (d) 1.5 and 4.9. We compute the hazard rates for each 
student moving across the grade groups and we analyze if there is a differential effect in the 
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treatment year.23 In Table 6 of the web appendix, we show the transition rates across grade 
groups for each year and in Table 9 we show the differential effect between 1990 and the 
average across all other years. We see that a student previously in group (a) is more likely to 
remain in this same group in 1990, compared with other years. Overall, students in a high 
grade group ((a) and (b)) are less likely to move to a lower grade group in 1990 compared to 
other years. Moreover, the students in the lowest grade group (d) are more likely to move to a 
higher grade group in 1990. These results suggest that the results are positive for all student 
grade (ability) groups. 
The three different tests show that the provision of relative performance feedback 
information had a positive effect on all students’ performance. This supports the competitive 
preferences hypothesis rather than the self-perception hypothesis.  
Finally, we disaggregate the analysis at the subject level. We group subjects into four: 
Languages (Basque, Spanish and Foreign Language), Sciences (Maths, Biology, Chemistry, 
Physics, Geology and Technical Drawing), Arts (History, Latin, Philosophy, Literature, Greek 
and History of Art) and Others (EATP, Physical Education, Religion/Ethics, Music and 
Drawing). Table 10 includes the estimates for all levels and for each level separately. In 
column 1 we can see that students improve their performance in all subject groups. Moreover, 
the strongest effect is found in the Science group. From this analysis there are important 
policy implications. We can see that students are improving in subjects considered very 
relevant such as Math and Languages rather than in subjects such as Physical Education. In 
recent years the poor test scores in technical subjects, such as Physics and Math, in many 
western countries have hit the headlines and the improvement of which has been regarded as 
being high priority (See PISA reports 2006). 
In columns 2 to 5 in Table 10, the estimates are presented for each of the different levels. 
Language and Science subjects show similar pattern to the aggregate results, with regard to 
the different levels. There appears to be a positive and strong effect on Levels 1 and 4, while 
the intermediate levels are unaffected. The exception to this is the Science subjects, which 
appear also significant (at the 5% level) during Level 2. Also, although we have seen a 
positive and significant effect on Arts, the level analysis shows that this is solely driven by 
changes in Level 3 that we cannot explain.  
                                                 
23 We estimate a simple transition rate (hab) using: t
abh
edtSctSaSatS
−
=≠≠== ),,0Pr( . We take the negative of 
the log to compute the transition rate. The transition rates in Table A.6 are multiplied by 100 so that they can be 
interpreted as the percentage of students in one grade group moving to another in the course of a year.  
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5.4. Lasting Effect: Did the Treatment Have a Lasting Effect?  
Our analysis so far has consistently shown that there is a positive and significant effect of 
the additional information on grades. We may also pose the question of whether there is a 
lasting effect of the treatment once it has been removed, that is, whether the effect persists on 
those students who received the information treatment. Given the panel element, we are able 
to track students over time to investigate whether there is a lasting effect of the treatment.  
In Table 11, we allow for the possibility of lasting effects and we see that once the 
treatment was removed there was no further effect. When the relative performance 
information is removed, the grades of those students who did receive the information in the 
previous year are not distinguishable from the grades obtained in the academic years in which 
no information was provided. This may be the consequence of the students’ lack of awareness 
about the relative performance information or, alternatively, it may be that the past 
information that students received is no longer relevant; since students moved to a new level 
or they have new classmates. In turn, the kernel distribution of Figure 2 implies that the 
difference in grades that we observe before and after treatment is the result of grade inflation, 
and not due to a lasting effect. The exception comes from Level 3 students who got the 
additional information in Level 1 and experienced a negative effect in their grades. By 
looking closely at each subject, we find that the effect is driven by only one subject, which is 
History. We cannot explain this effect.  
 
5.5. Dispersion: What Happened to Dispersion Among Students? 
In this section we turn our attention to the effect of the relative performance feedback 
information on the dispersion among students’ grades. So far, we have observed that (overall) 
there has been a positive shift in the mean grades during the treatment. However, one may 
also be interested in understanding whether the treatment affected the spread of grades among 
students. The dispersion analysis offers a new angle from which we can evaluate the 
relevance of the competitiveness and self-perception theory, as well as the desirability of the 
social comparison policy. While increasing grades may be seen as a desirable outcome, 
increasing the dispersion may have negative connotations. In particular, increasing the gap 
between bad and good students could be seen as a drawback of the policy.  
We measure dispersion using the variance. Our outcome variable is therefore, the squared 
difference between student i’s average grade across subjects in year t and the mean grade of 
that year and level, given by 2)( tit MeanGrade − . 
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ititittit YrMeanAboveMeanAboveYearTrendMeanGrade εβββββ +++++=− 90*__1990)( 432102  (5.5) 
We estimated equation (5.5) with and without controls. Table 12 shows the results with 
controls. From column 1 we can see that the dispersion among students was not affected by 
the treatment. In addition, we see that dispersion increases with the levels of high school. 
From our mean analysis we observed that grades fell in the later years in high school. Here, 
we see that the further the student progresses through high school, not only do subjects get 
more difficult, such that grades become lower, but there is also a greater separation between 
good and bad students. In column 2 we identify separately the dispersion among students who 
are above and below the mean (of their level) and interact it with the treatment year. We 
observe that there is no differential effect above and below the mean. From columns 3 to 8, 
this is separately done by Levels and the same results hold.  
 
5.6. Robustness: Repeaters, Leavers 
In this section, we conduct some robustness exercises to complement our main analysis. 
We look at whether the additional information affected the sample of students. In particular, 
we focus on those who repeat levels and those who leave school before graduating. We may 
be concerned that the policy affected them differentially and this affects, or even drives, our 
main results. 
First, we focus on the students who repeat a level. We proceed in two ways. First, we look 
to see if the treatment had any effect on the probability of a student repeating a level. We find 
that this is not the case. Second, we re-estimate our main regression by including an 
interaction between the (treatment) year 1990 and the dummy for those who repeat a level. 
We do this for all levels, as well as for each level separately and conclude that there is no 
differential effect. See Table 7 in the web appendix.  
Second, we turn our attention to those students who leave school. In order for us to see if 
the treatment had any effect on leaving school, we look at the probability of staying, leaving 
after the first, second and third year respectively. Overall, we find that there is no significant 
effect on staying in school, neither is there any effect in leaving school after the second or 
third year. However, we do see that students in Level 1 during treatment are less likely to 
leave. It may be that the pool of student changes as a result of this, however, one would 
expect that the worst students are the ones most likely to leave and we therefore would expect 
to find the negative effect on the grades in year 1990. Since our main results show that there 
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is a positive effect, this source of selection would bias down our results. See Table 8 in the 
web appendix.  
 
5.7. External Validity: Using National Level Exams (Selectividad) 
In this section we address the concern that the effect may be “artificially” driven by 
agents within the school such as teachers, and provide evidence that rules out this possibility.  
An important concern is that the effect was entirely driven by the teachers who reacted to 
the treatment by altering the grades of the students in that year. Intuitively, there are a number 
of reasons why we have no reason to believe that teachers at any level would react to the 
additional information. Firstly, teachers always have this information since they know the 
distribution of grades in their class every year. Secondly, in principle they have no incentive 
to react, since they do not receive a “bonus” for good performance in the treatment year. 
Thirdly, if we believed that the teachers were curving the distribution, then we should not 
observe any effect of treatment (as they are trying to maintain the same distribution). Finally, 
schools in Spain are very careful to ensure that the Level 4 grades are representative of the 
Selectividad grade and many schools use this as a marketing tool to attract students to the 
school. However, all these reasons are not a guarantee for the teachers being ultimately 
driving the results in anticipation of students or their parents’ reactions.  
To address this issue, we use students’ grades from “Selectividad” exams and repeat our 
previous analysis. The Selectividad exams are national level exams (similar to SATs in the 
USA) taken by students after the completion of Level 4. These exams are written and graded 
by external bodies on national standards, accounting for 50% of the overall grade to enter 
University. The other 50% is determined by grades in Level 1 to Level 4. However, the 
Selectividad exams are based on the material covered only in Level 4, making this an 
important level. The drawback of this external validity check is that we can only perform it 
with Level 4 students. However, since the observed effect is strongest for Level 1 and Level 4 
students, it is yet a very relevant test. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that we can 
extrapolate our finding from the proposed test to rule out teachers’ effect and apply this to the 
other years.  
Replicating our earlier analysis, we find that in the treatment year (1990) there is a strong 
and positive effect of additional information that allows for social comparison on students’ 
Selectividad grades. In Table 13 we see in the first two columns our earlier results for the 
effect of treatment for Level 4 and in the last two columns the analysis is replicated for using 
only Selectividad grades (on the same students). Overall, the effect seems to be even stronger 
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(around 0.75) for Selectividad. It is reassuring to see that our main findings hold with the 
Selectividad data, where the school teachers had no influence on the grading, which suggests 
that the effect is coming from students putting in more effort when the additional information 
is provided. We replicate the analysis using placebo treatment for all other years and find a 
very similar pattern to our school results (see Figure 7).  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have found that the provision of relative performance feedback 
information had a strong and positive effect on high school students’ performance; it 
increased overall grades by 5%. This is a remarkable finding for two reasons. First, students 
did not receive any explicit reward (penalty) from being above (below) the average (piece-rate 
incentives), but still reacted to the information. Second, this effect is comparable with the 
effects found by the education literature on improving students’ attainment by investing in 
school inputs. However, unlike investing in school inputs providing relative performance 
information involves no cost. Furthermore, this effect was significant for students of all 
ability types but it had no lasting effect once the treatment effect was removed.  
We outlined two potential explanations for why students would react to the provision of 
relative performance feedback information and we find support for the competitive 
preferences hypothesis. There was no student who was discouraged by this information. 
However, we also find that this information becomes more relevant when students are less 
familiar about how their ability relates to the ability of other students (Level 1 students 
compared to students in subsequent years). This implies that the self-perception of ability may 
be an important driving force. Also, notice that unlike for the competitiveness theory, one 
important assumption for the self-perception theory is that ability and effort are complements 
in performance. This assumption might be questionable and one possible interpretation of the 
results is that effort and ability are in fact substitutes in performance.  
This paper has shown the potential (positive) effect that the provision of relative 
performance feedback information can have in motivating high school students. Further 
research should be directed to analyzing the role that this information plays in motivating 
individuals, both in schooling as well as in any real-effort setting.  
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Tables and Figures  
 
 
Table 1. Number of Students by Year and Level  
  Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Total 
1986-1987 109 81 70 81 341 
1987-1988 121 91 71 59 342 
1988-1989 139 104 91 54 388 
1989-1990 137 122 101 75 435 
1990-1991 92 130 124 80 426 
1991-1992 99 97 122 93 411 
1992-1993 97 92 101 106 396 
1993-1994 93 87 99 97 376 
1994-1995 56 75 78 90 299 
Total 943 879 857 735 3414 
Notes: Data on students’ grades are provided by Oiartzo Ikastola (school) for academic years 1986-1995. The 
dataset contains 3,414 students but an unbalanced panel of 1,313. From 1990 onwards students have the option 
to stay at their nearby middle school and so there are fewer Level 1 students. We do, however, have the data on 
these students but chose not to include it in our analysis as they did not receive the treatment. We check for 
sample selection and class size changes. We have one class group missing from our dataset in 1994-1995.  
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Table 2. Subjects’ Descriptive Statistics 
 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Subjects Obs. Mean S. D. Obs. Mean S. D. Obs. Mean S. D. Obs. Mean S. D. 
Basque 943 6.554 2.084 879 6.688 1.579 857 6.425 1.606 700 6.723 1.770 
Spanish 943 6.437 1.951 879 6.601 1.703 124 5.964 1.810 718 5.919 1.722 
Latin      879 6.848 2.068           
Foreign Language 943 6.654 1.901 879 6.128 1.902 855 6.022 1.940 714 5.937 1.699 
Technical Drawing 943 6.413 1.754                
Philosophy           857 6.474 1.759 707 6.385 1.827 
Geography      879 7.130 1.718           
Music 943 7.277 1.501                
History 943 6.486 1.906      857 6.461 1.989      
Religion 943 7.642 1.155 879 7.912 1.220 733 7.636 1.202      
Mathematics 943 6.215 1.953 879 6.211 1.979           
Physics/Chemistry      879 6.763 2.028           
Biology 943 6.599 1.713    .           
Physical Education 935 7.505 1.243 872 7.416 1.198 835 7.328 1.107      
EATP      879 7.888 1.063 857 7.477 1.291      
Third Level Options  
(Arts Track):                     
Spanish Literature           306 6.165 1.704      
Latin           306 5.786 2.024      
Greek           110 5.805 1.941      
Mathematics           244 5.309 2.284      
Third Level Options  
(Science Track):                     
Spanish Literature           13 5.885 2.033      
Biology           539 6.396 2.007      
Physics/Chemistry           550 5.880 2.349      
Mathematics           503 5.902 2.275      
Fourth Level Options  
(Arts Track):                     
Spanish Literature                254 6.053 1.738 
History                264 6.443 1.964 
Latin                134 5.940 1.632 
Greek                0    
History of Art                274 6.591 1.717 
Mathematics                146 5.983 1.781 
Fourth Level Options  
(Science Track):                     
Mathematics                434 6.114 2.031 
Physics                350 5.563 2.052 
Chemistry                387 5.939 2.136 
Biology                192 6.922 1.898 
Geology                105 6.600 1.775 
Technical Drawing                   206 6.238 1.876 
Notes: For each level, the mean and standard deviation for grades are reported. Students study 10 subjects per 
level. In Levels 1 and 2 all subjects are compulsory. In Levels 3 and 4 students can choose between the Arts and 
the Science track and can then choose options within each track. There are, however, four subjects (Basque, 
Spanish Mathematics and Foreign Language) that are taught in each level. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Years 1986-1994         
Prop. of  Girls 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.6 
Prop. of Repeaters 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.08 
Group (Average size) 32.61 30.64 32.4 29.33 
Attrition Number (by cohort)  -- -10.17 0 -16.17 
Prop. of Science Route -- --  0.64 0.61 
Number of teachers 14 15 14 14 
Year 1990         
Prop. Of  Girls 0.54 0.62 0.52 0.6 
Prop. Of Repeaters 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.04 
Group (Average size) 30.67 32.5 31 27.67 
Attrition Number (by cohort) -- 0 0 1 
Prop. Of Science Route -- -- 0.7 0.56 
Number of teachers 12 14 13 15 
Notes: For each level, the means are reported for the treatment year (1990) and all other years in the data. In 
Levels 1 and 2 all subjects are compulsory. Attrition is the average number of students (in a given cohort) that 
leave (negative sign) or that arrive (positive sign) high school.  
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Table 4: Aggregate Effect on Performance (Grades): Different Estimators 
  OLS RE FE OLS RE FE 
OLS 
(LAG) 
OLS 
(LAG) 
Constant 6.36 6.877 7.632 5.709 5.337 5.542 0.045 -0.797 
  [0.046]** [0.054]** [0.048]** [0.072]** [0.087]** [0.075]** [0.110] [0.114]** 
Trend 0.06 -0.092 -0.26 0.079 0.07 0.065 -0.042 -0.034 
  [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.012]** [0.009]** [0.012]** [0.012]** [0.008]** [0.008]** 
Year 1990 0.296 0.286 0.275 0.255 0.272 0.273 0.187 0.204 
  [0.072]** [0.041]** [0.039]** [0.069]** [0.037]** [0.037]** [0.051]** [0.047]** 
Girl       0.279 0.323     0.13 
        [0.046]** [0.070]**     [0.034]** 
Level 1       0.649 1.069 1.054     
        [0.066]** [0.048]** [0.048]**     
Level 2       0.787 1.068 1.059   0.601 
        [0.067]** [0.042]** [0.042]**   [0.043]** 
Level 3       0.376 0.59 0.584   0.178 
        [0.067]** [0.037]** [0.037]**   [0.042]** 
Repeater       -0.965 0.379 0.381   0.945 
        [0.100]** [0.059]** [0.059]**   [0.075]** 
Ave(t-1)             0.976 1.032 
              [0.015]** [0.015]** 
Observations 3414 3414 3414 3414 3414 3414 2156 2156 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 5% level and ** denotes significance at the 1% level. The number of 
observations falls when using OLS (LAG) as we must restrict analysis to students in Levels 2 to 4. 
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Table 5: Aggregate Effect on Performance (Grades): Robustness 
Constant 6.877 5.337 6.877 5.337 7.731 5.514 
 [0.054]** [0.087]** [0.212]** [0.148]** [0.107]** [0.120]** 
Trend -0.092 0.07 -0.092 0.07 -0.262 0.053 
 [0.010]** [0.012]** [0.031]** [0.019]** [0.003]** [0.010]** 
Year 1990 0.286 0.272 0.286 0.272 0.261 0.239 
 [0.041]** [0.037]** [0.071]** [0.065]** [0.010]** [0.009]** 
Girl  0.323  0.323  0.362 
  [0.070]**  [0.092]**  [0.058]** 
Level 1  1.069  1.069  1.077 
  [0.048]**  [0.081]**  [0.031]** 
Level 2  1.068  1.068  1.065 
  [0.042]**  [0.086]**  [0.022]** 
Level 3  0.59  0.59  0.602 
  [0.037]**  [0.075]**  [0.014]** 
Repeater  0.379  0.379   
  [0.059]**  [0.067]**   
Cluster  
(by Class and Year) No No Yes Yes No No 
Teacher Fixed Effect No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 3414 3414 3414 3414 35218 35218 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 5% level and ** denotes significance at the 1% level. All estimations are 
done using random effects (RE) estimation. The number of observations increases approximately by a factor 10 
when we control for teacher fixed effects because we must change the dimensionality of the data. Initially, we 
look by individual over time but now, since each student does 10 different subjects with different teachers, we 
reshape the data to allow for this additional feature.  
 
 
Table 6: Year 1990 Effect on Performance (Grades) by Levels 
 All Levels Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Equation 
(5.1) 0.286 0.531 0.018 0.099 0.585 
 [0.041]** [0.141]** [0.117] [0.130] [0.183]** 
Equation 
(5.2) 0.272 0.511 -0.027 0.112 0.558 
 [0.037]** [0.138]** [0.116] [0.127] [0.181]** 
Observations 3414 943 879 857 735 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 5% level and ** denotes significance at the 1% level. We report the 
coefficients and standard errors for only the Year 1990 variable but in the regression we include all the variables 
in equations (5.1) and (5.2), respectively. Estimations using All Levels are done using random effects (RE) 
estimation and OLS estimation is used when we estimate each level separately. 
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Table 7: Effect on Performance (Grades) by Gender  
  
All 
Levels Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Constant 6.746 6.127 6.389 6.105 5.876 
  [0.070]** [0.090]** [0.097]** [0.116]** [0.139]** 
Trend -0.09 0.13 0.114 0.052 -0.002 
  [0.010]** [0.017]** [0.017]** [0.019]** [0.022] 
Year 1990 0.341 0.489 0.083 0.138 0.676 
  [0.063]** [0.207]* [0.188] [0.188] [0.288]* 
Girl 0.216 0.257 0.222 0.355 0.39 
  [0.077]** [0.088]** [0.091]* [0.100]** [0.123]** 
Girl*Year 1990 -0.097 0.072 -0.134 -0.035 -0.143 
  [0.083] [0.282] [0.241] [0.259] [0.372] 
Observations 3414 943 879 857 735 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 5% level and ** denotes significance at the 1% level. Estimations using All 
Levels are done using random effects (RE) estimation and OLS estimation is used when we estimate each level 
separately. 
 
Table 8: Effect on Performance (Grades) by Ability 
  All Levels Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Constant 6.044 4.988 5.739 5.721 5.393 5.247 5.373 5.183 
  [0.071]** [0.092]** [0.075]** [0.083]** [0.087]** [0.099]** [0.140]** [0.153]** 
Trend -0.042 0.043 0.091 0.092 0.034 0.04 -0.066 -0.066 
  [0.012]** [0.013]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.016]* [0.016]* [0.023]** [0.023]** 
Year 1990 0.194 0.254 -0.178 -0.188 0.144 0.169 0.603 0.65 
  [0.077]* [0.069]** [0.118] [0.119] [0.125] [0.124] [0.197]** [0.196]** 
Above(t-1) 1.504 1.441 1.833 1.819 1.992 1.978 2.131 2.182 
  [0.057]** [0.054]** [0.066]** [0.068]** [0.072]** [0.074]** [0.103]** [0.108]** 
Above(t-1)*Year 90 0.048 -0.081 0.123 0.128 0.066 0.04 -0.01 -0.058 
  [0.111] [0.099] [0.163] [0.163] [0.181] [0.180] [0.284] [0.283] 
Level 2  0.975          
   [0.047]**          
Level 3  0.489          
   [0.043]**          
Girl  0.24  0.051  0.231  0.211 
   [0.062]**  [0.061]  [0.066]**  [0.098]* 
Repeater  0.445  -0.108  -0.057  0.464 
    [0.076]**   [0.153]   [0.129]   [0.188]* 
Observations 2152 2152 777 777 771 771 604 604 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 5% level and ** denotes significance at the 1% level. Estimations using All 
Levels are done using random effects (RE) estimation and OLS estimation is used when we estimate each level 
separately. The number of observations falls when using All Levels as we must restrict analysis to students in 
Levels 2 to 4. 
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Table 9: Differential in Grade Group Transition between 
1990 and all other years 
  Grade Group(t) 
  A b c D 
Grade a 22.25 -16.76 -5.26 -0.23 
Group(t-1) b 8.37 3.23 -12.54 0.94 
 c -0.50 0.16 11.68 -11.34 
 d 0.00 -1.30 17.46 -16.16 
Notes: The Grade Groups are classified as: (a) 8 and 10, (b) 7 and 7.9, (c) 5 and 6.9 and (d) 1.5 and 4.9. Each 
cell computes the difference between Year 1990 grade group and the grade group of the rest of the years. This 
table is derived using the transition rate table in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
 
Table 10: Effect on Performance (Grades) by Subject Groups 
 All Levels Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Languages 0.165 0.728 -0.144 0.195 0.587 
 [0.044]** [0.191]** [0.145] [0.158] [0.182]** 
Sciences 0.385 1 0.361 0.1 0.65 
 [0.065]** [0.182]** [0.177]* [0.222] [0.223]** 
Arts 0.336 0.146 0.186 0.685 0.265 
 [0.063]** [0.209] [0.191] [0.162]** [0.205] 
Others 0.157 0.245 -0.066 -0.098 NA 
 [0.041]** [0.104]* [0.078] [0.086] NA 
Observations 3404 943 879 857 725 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 5% level and ** denotes significance at the 1% level. Estimations using All 
Levels are done using random effects (RE) estimation and OLS estimation is used when we estimate each level 
separately. Language subjects include Basque, Spanish, Foreign Language; Science subjects include 
Mathematics, Biology, Chemistry, Physics, Geology, Technical Drawing; Art subjects include History, Latin, 
Philosophy, Literature, Greek, History of Art; Other subjects include EATP, Physical Education, 
Religion/Ethics, Music, Drawing. 
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Table 11: Lasting Effect on Performance (Grades) 
  Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Constant 6.275 6.529 6.337 6.121 
  [0.075]** [0.081]** [0.095]** [0.116]** 
Trend 0.127 0.116 0.057 -0.014 
  [0.017]** [0.018]** [0.020]** [0.027] 
Year 1990 0.531 -0.009 0.054 0.627 
  [0.141]** [0.119] [0.134] [0.192]** 
Year 1991  -0.203 0.016 0.326 
   [0.136] [0.137] [0.186] 
Year 1992   -0.366 -0.26 
    [0.153]* [0.187] 
Year 1993    0.276 
     [0.205] 
Observations 943 879 857 735 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 5% level and ** denotes significance at the 1% level. All regressions are 
estimated using OLS. The dummy variables Year1991, Year1992 and Year1993 denote lasting effect. For 
example, a student in Level 1 in 1990 will be in Level 2 in 1991. 
 
Table 12: Effect on Dispersion of Performance (Variance of Grades) 
  All Levels Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Constant 2.267 2.344 2.073 2.206 1.667 1.679 1.561 1.563 1.477 1.671 
  [0.145]** [0.151]** [0.169]** [0.186]** [0.194]** [0.211]** [0.210]** [0.223]** [0.295]** [0.315]** 
Trend 0.03 0.031 -0.14 -0.14 -0.022 -0.021 0.087 0.086 0.231 0.235 
  [0.019] [0.019]+ [0.032]** [0.032]** [0.035] [0.035] [0.036]* [0.036]* [0.048]** [0.048]** 
Year 90 -0.067 -0.103 -0.331 -0.647 0.319 0.725 0.124 0.019 -0.479 -0.625 
  [0.140] [0.195] [0.264] [0.354] [0.240] [0.345]* [0.239] [0.327] [0.393] [0.566] 
Level 1 -0.679 -0.678             
  [0.134]** [0.134]**             
Level 2 -0.782 -0.783             
  [0.135]** [0.135]**             
Level 3 -0.544 -0.543             
  [0.135]** [0.135]**             
Girl -0.124 -0.109 0.071 0.087 -0.192 -0.18 -0.331 -0.335 -0.044 0.003 
  [0.093] [0.094] [0.157] [0.158] [0.171] [0.171] [0.171]+ [0.172]+ [0.250] [0.251] 
Repeater -0.304 -0.371 0.852 0.762 -0.309 -0.353 -0.108 -0.106 -1.405 -1.57 
  [0.202] [0.205]+ [0.420]* [0.425] [0.434] [0.444] [0.330] [0.335] [0.444]** [0.454]** 
Above_Mean   -0.178  -0.273  -0.038  0.001  -0.466 
    [0.100]  [0.167]  [0.188]  [0.186]  [0.265] 
(Above_Mean) 
*Yr90   0.068  0.676  -0.778  0.229  0.302 
    [0.279]  [0.531]  [0.479]  [0.480]  [0.784] 
Observations 3414 3414 943 943 879 879 857 857 735 735 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 5% level and ** denotes significance at the 1% level. Estimations using All 
Levels are done using random effects (RE) estimation and OLS estimation is used when we estimate each level 
separately. The dependent variable is the variance of the average grade. 
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Table 13: Aggregate Effect on Performance (Grades): 
Selectividad Grades 
  L4 Grade L4 Grade Select. Select. 
Constant 6.127 5.924 5.045 5.085 
  [0.115]** [0.136]** [0.095]** [0.108]** 
Trend -0.005 0.004 0.149 0.153 
  [0.022] [0.022] [0.018]** [0.017]** 
Year 1990 0.585 0.558 0.808 0.752 
  [0.183]** [0.181]** [0.129]** [0.125]** 
Gender   0.368   0.029 
    [0.115]**   [0.085] 
Repeater   -0.655   -1.1 
    [0.205]**   [0.172]** 
Observations 735 735 469 469 
Notes: Data on students’ grades are provided by Oiartzo Ikastola (school), for academic years 1986-1995. Data 
on students’ Selectividad grades (for the same students) are provided by University of Basque Country, for 
academic years 1986-1995.  * denotes significance at the 5% level and ** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
All regressions are estimated using OLS. The analysis is restricted to Level 4 students.  
 
Figure 1: Distribution of Grades for Basque and Math Subjects by Group-Year 
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Notes: Each vertical bar represents the distribution of grades in a particular group and academic year, and the 
shaded regions show the proportion of students that obtain each possible grade (1.5, 4, 5.5, 6.5, 7 and 9.5). 
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Figure 2: Kernel Distribution Before, During and After the Treatment 
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Notes: Kernel distribution of students’ grades, over all students. The dotted line represents the treatment year 
(1990) 
 
Figure 3: Kernel Distribution Before, During and After the Treatment (By Level) 
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Notes: Kernel distribution of students’ grades, by level. The dotted line represents the treatment year (1990) 
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Figure 4: Placebo Treatment (Years Before) 
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Notes: Equation (5.1) using data for years 1986-1989 and for comparison the figure includes the effect in the 
treatment year (1990). The dotted line represents a 95% confidence interval.  
 
Figure 5: Placebo Treatment Using Only Level-1 (All Years) 
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Notes: 5 (1) using data Level 1 data for all years (excluding treatment year (1990)) and for comparison the figure 
includes the effect in the treatment year (1990). The dotted line represents a 95% confidence interval.  
 
Figure 6: Quantile Regression for Equation (5.1). 
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Notes: 10% to 90% quantile. The dotted line represents a 95% confidence interval. At the 60th quantile the 
average grade is 6.3 and this is close to the average.   
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Figure 7: Placebo Treatment Using Selectividad Grades  
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Notes: Equation (5.1) using data Selectividad data for all years (excluding treatment year (1990)) and for 
comparison the figure includes the effect in the treatment year (1990). The dotted line represents a 95% 
confidence interval.  
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